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Abstract 
When popular referendums fail to ratify new international agreements or succeed in reversing 
existing ones, it not only affects domestic voters, but also creates negative spillovers for the 
other parties to such agreements. This paper explores how voters respond to this strategic 
environment. We use original survey data from a poll fielded just one day before the 2015 
Greek bailout referendum Ð a referendum in which the stakes for other countries were 
particularly high Ð in order to investigate how expectations about the likely foreign response 
to a non-cooperative referendum outcome influence voting behavior and to what extent 
foreign policymakers can influence those expectations. Our analysis of the Greek referendum 
shows that such expectations had a powerful effect on voting behavior: voters expecting that a 
non-cooperative referendum outcome would force Greece to leave the Eurozone were 
substantially more likely to vote Yes than those believing that it would result in renewed 
negotiations with the countryÕs creditors. Leveraging the bank closure that took place right 
before the vote, we also show that costly signals by foreign actors made voters more 
pessimistic about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote and substantially increased the 
share of cooperative votes. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank Erik Arias, Lucio Baccharo, Jeff Frieden, Julia Gray, Mark Hallerberg, Simon Hug, 
Martijn Huysmans, Lukas Linsi, Lucas Leemann, Gail McElroy, Peter Rosendorff, Gerald Schneider, Marco 
Steenbergen, Rachel Wellhausen, and participants in seminars at the Universities of Mainz, Konstanz, York, 
Newcastle, Zurich, Complutense, the LSE, the WTI Bern, the ÒFinancial Crisis ManagementÓ Workshop in 
Berlin, and the SPSA 2016, EPSA 2016, IPES 2016, and PEIO 2017 annual meetings for helpful comments on 
previous drafts of this paper. We also thank Ari Ray for helpful research assistance. The replication material for 
this article is provided on IOÕs replication website.   
	 2 
1.! Introduction 
After decades of Ôever closerÕ international cooperation, the economic integration 
process has come under pressure in recent years. Faced with increasing trade-offs between the 
gains from international cooperation, democracy, and national sovereignty,1 popular 
movements that aim at slowing down or even reversing international integration have 
proliferated. When such movements are successful, as in the case of the UKÕs ÒBrexitÓ 
referendum or the election of Donald Trump as US president, they challenge the viability of 
international institutions. The consequences of national democratic decisions can thus be felt 
strongly both domestically and internationally. In todayÕs interconnected world, such popular 
rejections of international cooperation, therefore, beg important questions with regard to 
international relations, national sovereignty, and democracy. To answer these questions, we 
need to better understand the motives underlying such rejections, the dilemmas and incentives 
such votes generate for policymakers, and the dynamics they produce in the international 
arena. In short, we need a better understanding of the mass politics of international 
cooperation and their implication for international relations. 
This paper seeks to hone our understanding of these issues by focusing on Europe, 
where integration-skeptic movements have been particularly successful and where popular 
referendums have allowed voters to decide directly on whether to accelerate, stop, or even 
reverse the highly advanced European integration process. An important feature of these 
decisions has been that their consequences extend well beyond the domestic realm. When 
referendums fail to ratify new cooperation agreements or succeed in reversing existing ones, 
they create negative spillovers for the other parties to such agreements, thus sparking fears of 
contagion and even disintegration. As a result, those other member-states have a clear interest 
in a cooperative referendum outcome. At the same time, they also have a range of options of 
how to respond to a negative referendum outcome and whether to accommodate the 
																																																								
1 Rodrik 2011 
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referendum countryÕs direct democratic choice or not. This creates interesting strategic 
dynamics in which foreign policymakers can interact with domestic voters during the 
referendum campaign in order to boost the cooperative vote.  
Our paper sets out to explore how voters behave in this kind of strategic environment, 
especially how their expectations about foreign reactions to a non-cooperative referendum 
outcome shape their vote intentions and to what extent foreign policymakers can influence 
those expectations. For this purpose, we leverage a fascinating and important case of a foreign 
policy referendum in which the stakes of other countries were particularly high: the 2015 
Greek bailout referendum. While on paper the referendum was simply meant to be about the 
terms of an international financial bailout package designed to tackle the countryÕs enormous 
financial crisis, it was widely feared at the time that a non-cooperative referendum outcome 
would put GreeceÕs entire Eurozone membership at risk. In addition, since a Greek exit from 
the currency union (colloquially referred to as ÒGrexitÓ) would put the irreversibility of the 
euro in question and would potentially create large contagion risks for other peripheral 
Eurozone countries, the referendum vote was also seen as a threat to the entire project of 
European monetary integration Ð with potentially enormous negative consequences for all 
other Eurozone members. 
To investigate how expectations and foreign signals about the likely response to a 
non-cooperative outcome influenced individual vote choices in the 2015 Greek referendum, 
we use original survey data from a unique poll fielded just one day before the vote. Our 
analysis shows that expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative referendum 
outcome can have a powerful effect on voting behavior: voters expecting that a No-vote 
would result in Grexit were substantially more likely to vote Yes, i.e., in favor of the proposed 
bailout agreement, than those believing that GreeceÕs creditors would accommodate a No-
vote by proposing better bailout terms in renewed negotiations. This effect was especially 
strong for the vast majority of voters who wanted to stay in the common currency. We also 
	 4 
show that there is room for foreign actors to shift votersÕ expectations and decisions in their 
favor by signaling their resolve not to accommodate a non-cooperative vote: in fact, we find 
that, following the announcement of the referendum, the European Central BankÕs (ECB) 
decision not to increase capital injections into Greek banks Ð thereby forcing their closure Ð 
influenced expectations and increased the share of cooperative votes. Overall, this study helps 
refine our understanding of how the strategic international dimension shapes the mass politics 
of international cooperation.  
 
2.! Expectations and foreign intervention in foreign policy referendum campaigns 
By their very nature, the consequences of national referendums on foreign policy, 
especially those on treaties concerning international cooperation and supranational 
integration, are also felt abroad, affecting not only domestic voters but also citizens of other 
countries. When such a referendum results in a vote that enables the initiation, widening, or 
deepening of international cooperation, these cross-country spillover effects are usually net 
positive. By contrast, whenever the outcome of a national foreign policy referendum impedes 
a deepening or continuation of cooperation, it tends to generate net negative cross-border 
spillover effects.  
Such negative outcomes of referendums on international cooperation are not a new 
phenomenon. From the 1972 rejection of EC membership by Norwegian voters to the 2016 
rejection of the EU-Ukraine accession agreement by Dutch voters, efforts to establish or 
deepen international cooperation have failed time and again at the polls.2 However, a closer 
look reveals that non-cooperative referendum outcomes have become both more frequent and 
more disruptive in recent years. Figure 1 lists all national referendums on questions 
concerning international cooperation from the 1970s until today and shows that the share of 
																																																								
2 For overviews, see Hobolt 2009 and Hug 2003. 
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referendums that resulted in a rejection of more or continued cooperation has markedly 
increased in recent years.  
 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
 
 The cross-border ripple effects of non-cooperative referendum outcomes have also 
grown with time. Whereas, for example, SwitzerlandÕs 1986 rejection of UN membership 
barely registered abroad, other countries have been much more impacted by the consequences 
of the Dutch and French rejections of the EU Constitution in 2005 or the 2016 UK 
referendum vote to leave the European Union. The magnitude of the potential spillover effects 
of a non-cooperative referendum outcome varies widely and depends on the specific 
circumstances of the referendum, such as the issue at stake, the political and economic 
importance of the referendum country for other countries, the level of integration, the rules of 
international cooperation, and the renegotiation process itself. Thus, spillover effects can be 
small, but they can also prove very costly for other member states, especially when the 
referendum outcome prevents other countries from cooperating further or even unilaterally 
challenges the status quo of an existing arrangement. All else equal, the more integrated the 
referendum country is within a politically interconnected and highly institutionalized 
organization (such as the EU), the larger the potential damage a negative referendum vote can 
cause abroad. And the higher the potential spillover effects are, the stronger the interest of 
other member states in a cooperation-friendly referendum outcome. 
Yet, whereas the referendum country is free to vote in favor or against cooperation, the 
other countries are also free to choose how to react. A range of foreign responses is possible, 
ranging from more to less accommodating ones. For instance, foreign partners may 
accommodate the reservations of the dissenting country by modifying the agreement, granting 
exceptions, or negotiating a new one that better reflects the concerns of the referendum 
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country. But they can also pursue more hardline responses such as making no concessions or 
simply moving forward without the referendum country. This type of decision is not easy 
because the other countries face a dilemma: accommodating the democratically expressed 
wishes of the referendum countryÕs electorate allows them to salvage as many of the 
cooperation gains as possible but also carries moral hazard and political contagion risks, as 
other countries might be incentivized to call national referendums to improve their relative 
position in the union. On the other hand, pursuing a hard stance vis--vis the referendum 
country allows them to discourage such opportunistic behavior, yet it is likely to be costly for 
everyone involved because of the foregone gains from cooperation. This dilemma will be 
particularly pronounced when the potential spillover effects of a negative referendum vote are 
large.  
Whatever the most likely strategic response on the part of other member states, this 
response strongly determines how a negative referendum vote would ultimately play out for 
the referendum country. It thus shapes the underlying stakes of the referendum vote for 
everyone involved, including above all the referendum country itself. From the viewpoint of 
the referendum country, these stakes are lowest when a non-cooperative vote carries small 
negative externalities, and highest in referendums that leave the other countries highly 
exposed. This is because high spillover effects typically increase the range of (re-)negotiation 
options available to the countries involved, as more issue areas are affected and because a 
higher level of integration increases interdependence between states. Taken together with 
imperfect information over both the true preferences of multiple actors and the magnitude of 
spillover effects that have yet to materialize, this variability of final payoffs effectively 
renders the consequences of a non-cooperative referendum vote uncertain ex ante.3  
																																																								
3 Although all referendums are characterized by a lack of full information about potential outcomes, irrespective 
of whether the issue at hand is domestic or international (Kriesi 2005; Lupia 1994; Hobolt 2009), this strategic 
complexity and dependence on the response of other countries magnifies the uncertainty surrounding a negative 
referendum vote in a referendum on questions of international cooperation. 
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Because the consequences of a negative referendum outcome depend so strongly on 
the other countriesÕ response, voters are likely to take that into account when deciding how to 
vote. Policy preferences and expectations about those responses should hence jointly 
determine voting decisions in foreign policy referendums.4 Not surprisingly, foreign policy 
referendum campaigns are often characterized by distinct and often contradictory narratives 
about the risks and benefits associated with referendum outcomes.5 In such politicized 
environments, voters will form certain sets of beliefs about how foreign actors will react to a 
non-cooperative referendum vote. These expectations are likely to influence their voting 
behavior, especially in cases in which the spillover effects of their decision are potentially 
large.6 The more a voter believes in the likelihood of punishment for non-cooperation, the 
more likely that voter is to vote for cooperation. 
Figure 2 illustrates the wide divergence of expectations about the likely consequences 
in four recent foreign policy referendums with relatively large spillover effects abroad: the 
2008 Lisbon Treaty ratification referendum in Ireland, the 2014 Swiss referendum ÒAgainst 
Mass Immigration,Ó the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, and the 2016 ÒBrexitÓ referendum on 
EU membership. In all four referendums, expectations about the consequences of a non-
cooperative vote diverged widely between voters favoring and opposing cooperation. In each 
case, voters in favor of new or continued cooperation assessed the likely international 
responses associated with the non-cooperative referendum outcome (resisting further 
integration in the Irish case, defying compliance with an existing arrangement in the Greek 
case, and reversing existing forms of cooperation in the Swiss and British cases) much more 
negatively than voters opposed to such cooperation. 
 
*** Figure 2 about here *** 
																																																								
4  Christin, Hug, and Sciarini 2002 
5 Hobolt 2009; Finke and Beach 2017 
6 Hobolt 2009; Owen and Walter 2017 
	 8 
 
 Given the importance of votersÕ expectations in shaping vote intentions, all actors with 
a stake in the referendum outcome, including domestic and foreign ones, have the an 
incentive to influence these expectations. Foreign policymakers in particular may seek to 
sway voters towards a cooperative vote by coaxing them through normative appeals and 
promises of future benefits, or by threatening them with negative consequences in the case of 
a non-cooperative referendum outcome (in fact, they may also try to directly influence public 
opinion during the campaign, as the recent revelations about RussiaÕs efforts to meddle in 
Western elections show). Especially when other countries would be worse off under all 
potential outcomes of a non-cooperative referendum vote compared to the outcomes 
associated with a cooperative referendum vote, they have a strong strategic incentive to try to 
induce voters to cast a cooperative ballot.7 Yet, influencing domestic public opinion through 
foreign interventions is a difficult task. Not only is there a risk that these efforts may 
backfire,8 but foreign governments face private information and time-inconsistency problems 
that make it difficult for them to credibly communicate their actual resolve not to 
accommodate a non-cooperative vote.9 Because non-accommodation also imposes costs on 
those other countries themselves, their pledge to punish such a vote ex post may suffer from 
credibility issues. 
Much research in international relations has shown that one way to overcome such credibility 
problems is to send costly signals that reveal oneÕs true resolve.10 By engaging in activities 
that create costs not only for the referendum country but also for themselves, foreign 
policymakers can more credibly signal that they would not be willing to accommodate the 
referendum countryÕs non-cooperative vote. As a result, such costly signals from foreign 
																																																								
7 See also Haskel 1980, who argues that access to another society can provide foreign policymakers with power. 
8 Shulman and Bloom 2012 
9 Fearon 1995 
10 Fearon 1997 
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policymakers should make voters more pessimistic in their expectations about the 
consequences of a non-cooperative vote, making them more likely to cast a cooperative 
referendum vote. 
 
3.! The 2015 Greek bailout referendum  
To study the role of expectations and foreign intervention in foreign policy 
referendums, we focus on the July 2015 bailout referendum in Greece, a particularly 
interesting case of a foreign policy referendum with potentially wide-ranging spillover effects 
abroad. All Eurozone members had a strong interest in the Greek referendum because it was 
widely believed that a No-vote would effectively end GreeceÕs membership in the Eurozone. 
Grexit was an outcome European policymakers had been trying to avoid for years lest it 
would likely lead to renewed financial market pressure on other European crisis-ridden 
countries such as Italy or Portugal and would also trigger massive losses in the budgets and 
central bank balance sheets of surplus countries such as Germany and the Netherlands.11 
Perhaps most importantly, Grexit would put the viability of the entire European monetary 
integration project into question. A non-cooperative referendum outcome could thus create 
potentially very large negative spillover effects for other Eurozone members. Unsurprisingly, 
foreign intervention in the referendum campaign was unusually high and the likely 
consequences of a non-cooperative referendum outcome were a hotly debated issue during the 
campaign. These features render the 2015 Greek bailout referendum a critical and insightful 
case for studying the role of expectations and the effects of foreign intervention in foreign 
policy referendums.  
																																																								
11 Grexit would almost certainly have been accompanied by a Greek default not just on its public debt (ca. 
!210bn in July 2015) but also its Target2 liabilities (ca. ! 100bn).  
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Set against the background of one of the deepest and most prolonged economic crises 
in recent decades,12 the referendum was the culmination of a lengthy negotiation between the 
Greek government and the countryÕs creditors, in which neither side showed any willingness 
to compromise. Since the crisis started in 2010, ushering in a period marked by a sharp rise in 
unemployment and poverty levels, Greece had received two bailout packages on the condition 
of drastic austerity measures and structural reforms. Against that backdrop, the populist left-
wing party of SYRIZA came to power in January 2015 with an explicit mandate to end 
austerity. The new government of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras immediately embarked on an 
aggressive negotiation strategy aimed at softening the conditions attached to the existing 
bailout program in GreeceÕs favor. At the same time, worried about political contagion and 
moral hazard effects, the creditors remained firm in their resolve not to make any concessions. 
In the meantime, as the country was facing increasing liquidity problems, it became 
clear that Greece would need an extension of the existing bailout arrangement beyond its 30 
June 2015 expiration date. As that date drew nearer, events escalated. On 24 June 2015, the 
European Commission made a Ôtake-it-or-leave-itÕ proposal about the conditions attached to a 
bailout extension to Greece. Tsipras rejected the ultimatum and broke off negotiations  
accusing the creditors of blackmail and characterizing the proposal as an attempt to humiliate 
Greece. In the morning of June 27, Tsipras Ð in an effort to boost his bargaining leverage vis-
-vis the countryÕs creditors Ð surprised everyone by calling a referendum on the proposal to 
be held only one week later. To the dismay of European policymakers, he recommended that 
voters vote No, i.e., to reject the creditorsÕ proposal. 
An intense week of campaigning followed. Two dominant narratives emerged in the 
public debate, in which all major political actors took very clear stances. The three moderate 
pro-EU parties, conservative Nea Demokratia, center-left PASOK, and centrist To Potami, in 
tandem with European policymakers warned that a vote against the bailout proposal would 
																																																								
12 Gourinchas, Philippon, and Vayanos 2016 
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inevitably result in GreeceÕs exit from the Eurozone. They argued that European 
policymakers would not give in to the Greek government for fear that granting Greece better 
terms in response to a non-cooperative referendum vote would signal a lack of resolve to 
enforcing existing rules, thereby inciting similar non-cooperative behavior by other countries 
and eventually undermining the stability of the Eurozone. As a result, they strongly advocated 
voting Yes. By contrast, the No-camp, led by Tsipras and the coalition government parties of 
SYRIZA and ANEL (populist right), argued that a rejection of the agreement would enhance 
GreeceÕs bargaining leverage in renewed negotiations with its creditors and ultimately result 
in debt forgiveness and less austerity.13 This second narrative emphasized that GreeceÕs 
membership in the Eurozone was not at risk because Europeans would not want to damage 
the EMU project by allowing Greece to crash out of the euro. Greek voters were thus exposed 
to two very different competing narratives about the potential consequences of a non-
cooperative referendum outcome for the future of Greece and the Eurozone. 
The Greek referendum campaign also witnessed an unusual escalation of events 
involving foreign policymakers and politicians. For example, European Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director 
Christine Lagarde, and German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schuble strongly advocated a 
Yes-vote and threatened that a No-vote would result in disorderly default and Grexit.14 
Moreover, foreign policymakers directly intervened in the campaign. On June 28, one day 
after Tspiras had called the referendum, Eurozone finance ministers decided not to extend the 
ongoing bailout program scheduled to end three days later. As a consequence, the ECB 
announced later in the day that it would not increase the Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
(ELA) funds it had been supplying to keep the Greek banking system afloat with the 
																																																								
13 The extreme right-wing Golden Dawn party (as well as a far-left faction of SYRIZA) also came out fervently 
in favor of a No-vote, but their position was that this would be a way for Greece to leave the Eurozone. 
14 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/29/greek-crisis-referendum-eurozone-vote-germany-france-
italy 
	 12 
justification that such support could not be granted without a bailout program in effect. Faced 
with a bank run in the making, the Greek authorities decided later in the evening to call a 
bank holiday and impose capital controls. Both measures were meant to last at least until the 
day after the referendum and immediately caused long queues in front of the countryÕs 
ATMs.15 Another major international event occurred two days later when an IMF loan 
expired and Greece became the first developed country ever to default on its debt to the IMF. 
While threatening statements by foreign officials may have been nothing more than 
Ôcheap talkÕ, the creditorsÕ decision not to extend the existing bailout program or ELA 
assistance to Greek banks effectively amounted to a costly signal of their determination not to 
accommodate the anti-austerity mandate of the Greek government. Greece was being told in 
no less than unequivocal terms that the creditors would not budge in this game of ÔchickenÕ 
and that the country had to choose between the creditorsÕ path of austerity and leaving the 
euro. Recognizing the potential impact of this signal on the referendum campaign, Tsipras 
retorted that the creditorsÕ actions Òhad no other aim but to blackmail the will of the Greek 
people.Ó16 Yet, those actions were not just costly for Greece but also for the creditors: the 
economic damage they inflicted on the Greek economy vastly increased the amount needed 
for an eventual third bailout package, which would ultimately have to be financed out of 
foreign coffers. In fact, whereas the sum needed for a third bailout program had been 
estimated to range between !30 billion and !50 billion just one month before the 
referendum,17 the amount had risen to about !90 billion when a third bailout package was 
finally agreed on July12, 2015.18  
Despite all these international efforts to sway Greek voters to vote cooperatively on 5 
July 2015, however, the bailout referendum ended in a 61%-39% landslide victory for the No-
																																																								
15 In fact, the bank closure lasted for three weeks and some capital controls still remain in place at the time of 
writing. 
16 http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/28/news/economy/what-greek-prime-minister-tsipras-said/ 
17 http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/06/economist-explains-5 
18 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/index_en.htm 
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camp. Greek voters had rejected the bailout proposal in what amounted to a non-cooperative 
referendum vote.  
 
4.! Research design and data 
To understand the Greek vote in the 2015 bailout referendum and the role expectations 
and foreign interventions played in this context, we use original survey data from a poll we 
conducted on Saturday, 4 July 2015, one day before the referendum. Our nationwide, 
computer-assisted telephone survey covered 989 respondents identified through a multistage 
sampling process.19 Our survey was fielded just some hours before the polling stations 
opened, allowing us to gain a very accurate depiction of the motives of the Greek people and 
their vote. Although few surveys correctly predicted the strong rejection of the creditor 
proposal in the referendum, our survey mirrors the actual referendum outcome. Excluding 
those who were undecided or not planning to vote, 58.0% of respondents in our sample said 
they would reject the bailout package, which is very close to the 61.3% rejection rate in the 
actual referendum. 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. We first analyze the role of expectations played 
for the vote choice in the Greek referendum using both regression analysis and matching 
methods. We then explore the ability of foreign policymakers to shape votersÕ expectations 
about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote through costly signals. For this purpose, we 
concentrate on the effect of the ECBÕs decision not to increase emergency liquidity assistance 
to Greek banks, which forced the Tsipras government to close the banks, arguably the biggest 
event in the campaign period. Overall, we show that expectations about the response of 
																																																								
19 In the first stage (cluster sampling), electoral districts were chosen, in the second stage (stratified sampling) 
strata within each cluster were identified based on socioeconomic characteristics and in the third stage, a simple 
random sample was drawn within each stratum. Because interviews were done on fixed telephone lines, the 
youngest respondents are somewhat under- and female respondents overrepresented. We therefore use 
population weights in our analyses to match the basic demographics of the Greek population. The data was 
collected by the University of Macedonia (UoM) Research Institute of Applied Social and Economic Studies in 
Thessaloniki. 
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international actors were the most important predictor of individual vote intentions in the 
Greek 2015 bailout referendum, and that foreign intervention influenced both expectations 
and vote intentions. 
Our main variables in the first part of the analysis are individualsÕ vote intentions, 
expectations about the consequences of a No-vote, and attitudes towards to euro. To measure 
vote intention, we use respondentsÕ answers to the following question: ÒAs youÕre probably 
aware, PM Alexis Tsipras announced a referendum regarding the ratification of the 
agreement that GreeceÕs creditors offer, that will take place on next Sunday, July 5th. What 
are you going to vote in the referendum?Ó For our analysis, we create a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if voters stated that they intended to vote against the creditor proposal in 
the referendum or would probably do so, and 0 otherwise 20. The left-hand panel in Figure 4 
shows most voters had made up their mind about their referendum vote, with a majority 
stating that they would probably or certainly vote No.   
Expectations are measured with respondentsÕ answers to the question ÒWhat do you 
think will be the consequences of a No-vote?Ó Respondents could choose between (i) ÒGreece 
will exit the eurozoneÓ reflecting the narrative of the Yes-camp, that a non-cooperative 
referendum outcome would not be accommodated abroad, (ii) ÓThe government will continue 
negotiations,Ó which captures the No-campÕs narrative that a No-vote would enhance the 
governmentÕs bargaining leverage in a new round of negotiations, and (iii) ÒDonÕt know/no 
answer.Ó The right-hand panel in Figure 3 shows that most voters (86%) had clear 
expectations on the eve of the referendum. A majority believed that a non-cooperative 
referendum outcome would result in continued negotiations, whereas only about one quarter 
thought that a No-vote would lead to Grexit.  
 
*** Figure 3 about here *** 
																																																								
20 Table A1 in the online appendix shows the descriptive statistics of all variables. 
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Because GreeceÕs membership in the Eurozone was the key issue at stake in the Greek 
referendum, votersÕ attitude towards the euro conditioned by expectations should have a 
strong influence on their vote choice. We therefore asked respondents what they personally 
thought was best for GreeceÕs future: staying in the euro or adopting a national currency. 
More than three quarters of respondents (76%) wanted to keep the euro, whereas only 13% of 
respondents preferred to leave the euro relative to staying in the Eurozone (about one tenth of 
respondents were undecided about this issue or did not answer). Interestingly, even among 
those voting No in the referendum, a clear majority (61%) favored keeping the euro, the 
option that was preferred by virtually all Yes voters (98%).  
Our argument suggests that expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative 
vote should be a key driver of voting behavior. To account for alternative determinants of 
referendum vote choice identified by existing research, we control for a number of additional 
variables. Most importantly, much research has shown that voterÕs partisan identification is a 
strong determinant of the vote in popular referendums.21 Parties frame the issues at stake22 
and have a heuristic value for voters that allow them to overcome cognitive and information 
limitations around the referendum question.23 Moreover, foreign policy referendums often 
turn into a contest about the incumbent partiesÕ popularity.24 To control for these partisan and 
incumbency effects, we use the vote recall from the January 2015 general election in Greece 
and create dummy variables for the main political parties in Greece: the governing parties 
SYRIZA and ANEL, the conservative opposition party Nea Demokratia (reference category), 
the center-left PASOK, the centrist To Potami, and the radical right Golden Dawn. We also 
																																																								
21 Lupia 1994; Hobolt 2007 
22 Kriesi 2005 
23 Lau and Redlawsk 2001 
24 Dr and Konstantinidis 2013; Schneider and Weitsman 1996 
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include a dummy variable for those who abstained in the January elections and the other 
options.  
Past research has also shown that material interests affect vote choices in foreign 
policy referendums.25 For Greece, this suggests that more educated people should be more 
inclined to vote Yes, because they tend to disproportionally benefit from international 
integration. In contrast, the young, the unemployed, private sector employees and the self-
employed, who have been hurt most by GreeceÕs adjustment programs, should be more 
inclined to vote against the bailout proposal than public officials and pensioners, who have 
seen lower decreases in their incomes.26 We control for Education using an ordinal variable 
with the following categories 1) no education or primary studies; 2) secondary; 3) post-
secondary and 4) tertiary education. Age is operationalized in six categories Ñ 18-24, 25-34, 
35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and over 65 years oldÑ, and we include it as a continuous variable in all 
models.27 Occupation is operationalized with a series of dummy variables: public sector 
employee, private sector employee, unemployed, farmers, entrepreneur, pensioners and 
others. We also control for gender and whether the voter lives in a rural or urban area. 
 
5.! Vote choice in the 2015 Greek referendum: The role of expectations 
How did expectations about the likely consequences of a non-cooperative referendum 
outcome influence voting behavior in the 2015 Greek referendum? To answer this question, 
we gauge the effect of expectations on the referendum vote net from the possible confounders 
described above by using both regression and data-preprocessing techniques.  
Figure 4 shows the results from a regression analysis of vote intentions. It displays the 
change in the probability of voting ÒNoÓ as a result of moving from the baseline category to 
																																																								
25 e.g., Christin, Hug, and Sciarini 2002; Curtis, Jupille, and Leblang 2014; Tomz 2004 
26 Matsaganis and Leventi 2014 
27 see e.g., Urbatsch 2013 
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each of the variable values denoted on the vertical axis.28 As predicted by our argument, 
expectations about the consequences of a No-vote have substantially strong and statistically 
significant marginal effects on individualsÕ voting decisions, even after controlling for a range 
of alternative explanations. All else equal, a switch in expectations from Grexit to New 
Negotiations increases the probability of voting No by more than 40%.  
 
*** Figure 4 about here *** 
 
Not surprisingly, issue preferences and partisanship also mattered. A preference to 
reintroduce a national currency strongly increased the odds of voting No, whereas a pro-euro  
attitude reduced these odds (although to a lesser extent). Moreover, we find strong partisan 
effects: voters of Nea Demokratia (the baseline category), PASOK and To Potami were all 
significantly less likely to vote No than voters of the governing parties SYRIZA and ANEL as 
well as the right-wing Golden Dawn, all of which had campaigned in favor of a No-vote. 
Substantively, and taking the partisan effects globally, these effects are somewhat larger than 
in other studies,29 suggesting that parties played a particularly important role in the 
referendum campaign and that that voters were influenced by their preferred partyÕs 
recommendation. This is not surprising in this specific context, which was characterized by a 
polarized campaign, a short decision time of only one week and a complicated referendum 
question. Nonetheless, the marginal effects of the expectation variables remain large and their 
magnitude is comparable to the partisan effects.  
In contrast, material interests and demographics do not seem to matter much once 
expectations, issue preference, and partisan identification are taken into account. The only 
exception is age, where older voters are, as expected, more likely to vote Yes than younger 
																																																								
28 The full logit regression analysis can be found in the online appendix. The results remain robust when we 
additionally control for an imputed indicator of nationalism and respondentsÕ evaluation of EU membership.  
29 Hobolt 2007; Hug and Sciarini 2000 
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voters. To the extent that younger voters have been hit hardest by austerity in Greece,30 this is 
likely to reflect some pocketbook concerns, but in general the low association of material 
interests with voting behavior squares with recent research that emphasizes non-material 
factors in explaining policy preferences and vote choice. Education also does not matter much 
once preferences and expectations are taken into account. 
A key issue of concern is, of course, that partisan preferences and expectations are not 
independent from each other. To examine in more detail whether expectations have an 
independent effect on vote intentions or whether they are driven by partisanship and other 
variables such as issue preference, we repeat our analysis using matching analysis. Matching 
is a method of data pre-processing that allows us to pair ÒtreatedÓ cases with almost identical 
ÒcontrolÓ cases in order to estimate the treatment effects independent of shared confounders.31 
In our analysis, this means that each individual who is ÒtreatedÓ with the expectation that a 
non-cooperative referendum outcome will result in Grexit, is matched to another individual 
from our dataset who did not expect this outcome (the control category) but who is otherwise 
almost identical, meaning that he/she voted for the same party, had the same view of the euro 
and so on. 32 Matching analyses thus allow us to compare how different expectations about 
the consequences of a non-cooperative referendum outcome affect the vote intentions among 
individuals who are almost identical on all other relevant covariates. The advantage of the 
matching approach is not only that it allows us to evaluate more transparently the degree of 
similarity in pre-treatment covariates between control and treated units, it is also less model 
																																																								
30 Matsaganis and Leventi 2014 
31 for a review, see Sekhon 2009 
32 We choose the Grexit option as the treatment status because it leaves the modal category in the control group, 
thus increasing the pool of control units to be selected for the matching. In the Appendix, we replicate the 
analysis using the ÒNegotiations will continueÓ option as the treatment status, placing the ÒGrexitÓ option 
together with the DKs in the control group. Balance is now worsened, although the treatment effect estimates are 
substantively identical. We opt for a binary rather than a trichotomous treatment because balance tests for the 
DK category would be seriously underpowered.   
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dependent.33 We employ two methods of data pre-processing, genetic matching and entropy 
balancing.34 Although there are clear imbalances in the observable characteristics of the two 
groups in the raw data, including key demographics and the two most obvious attitudinal 
confounders, partisan preferences and attitudes towards the euro, these differences evaporate 
after the matching process. The matching process thus creates practically identical treatment 
and control distributions for all covariates, increasing our confidence in the results.  
 
 
*** Figure 5 about here *** 
 
Both matching analyses produce very similar estimates and confirm that expectations 
about the consequences of a non-cooperative referendum outcome significantly shaped the 
vote in the 2015 Greek referendum, independently of partisanship or issue preferences. Figure 
5 shows that on average and using the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated as our 
estimand of interest, individuals who expected Grexit in response to a No outcome of the 
referendum were 32 (entropy balancing) and 30 (genetic matching) percentage points less 
likely to vote against the proposed bailout package than individuals who believed that a No-
vote would result in new negotiations, but who were otherwise identical.35 Thus, the matching 
analysis confirms that expectations had a substantial effect on vote intentions, which reassures 
us of the robustness of our results. 
Our analysis so far has centered on the unconditional effect of expectations because a 
vast majority of Greeks had a clear preference for remaining in the Eurozone. But 
																																																								
33 Sekhon 2009. Matching only assures balance on observable characteristics. The identifying assumption is that 
unobserved characteristics of control and treatment observations are similar. We cannot test this assumption, but 
with matching we can at least be more transparent than with parametric regression techniques about whether 
there is balance in observed pre-treatment characteristics.  
34 The first is a nearest-neighbor matching method with balance optimization, the second a generalization of a 
propensity score weighting approach. For a more details as well as the balance statistics, see the online appendix. 
35 To examine the sensitivity of our results, we additionally conducted a Rosenbaum test. The results suggest 
that the likelihood that we are omitting an important unobserved confounder is very small.  
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expectations matter because they guide voters towards a vote choice that is consistent with 
their preferences. In our case for example, for the majority of Greeks, who wanted Greece to 
stay in the euro, the expectation that a No-outcome in the referendum would result in Grexit 
should drive them to vote for the Yes-option. For those, however, in favor of reintroducing a 
national currency, Grexit would be a desired outcome. Expectations about the consequences 
of a No-vote should thus matter much less for this latter group because of their embrace of 
Grexit. To see if this the case and to shed further light on the mechanism driving the effects of 
expectations on Greek votersÕ referendum choice, we therefore replicate our regression 
analysis from Figure 4, to explore the extent to which votersÕ preferred outcome Ð staying in 
or leaving the Eurozone Ð conditioned the effect of expectations on their vote. 
The conditional effects of expectations are shown in Figure 6, which display the 
change in the predicted probability of voting No as a result of expecting Grexit or new 
negotiations, respectively, compared to those who are undecided. Consistent with our 
argument, we find that expectations matter greatly for those who want to stay in the euro. If 
these voters are convinced that a non-cooperative vote will lead to new negotiations, possibly 
with more leverage for Greece, their likelihood of voting against the bailout package increases 
by about 38 percentage points. But those who fear that a No-vote would result in Grexit, 
although they want to stay in the Eurozone, are 23 percentage points less likely to vote against 
the bailout proposal. In contrast, and as expected, expectations matter much less for those in 
favor of a return to the national currency.  
 
*** Figure 6 about here *** 
 
Taken together, these findings underscore that votersÕ expectations about the 
consequences of a non-cooperative outcome strongly influenced their referendum choice, 
especially for those voters who wanted to remain in the common currency.  
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6.! Can foreign policymakers influence expectations and the vote? 
The 2015 Greek referendum campaign also provides a good environment to examine 
whether and how involvement by foreign policymakers can influence votersÕ expectations and 
ultimately vote intentions in favor of a cooperative vote. As discussed above, foreign 
policymakers not only issued stark warnings that a No-vote would spell the end of GreeceÕs 
membership in the Eurozone, 36 but also took costly measures designed to increase pressure 
on Greece and signal European policymakersÕ resolve to punish the country for a non-
cooperative referendum outcome. Our argument suggests that such a costly signal should shift 
votersÕ expectations towards a more pessimistic evaluation of the consequences of a No-vote, 
thus decreasing their propensity to vote against cooperation.  
To examine how costly signals sent by foreign policymakers affect expectations and 
vote intentions, we examine how the ECBÕs decision not to raise ELA assistance and the 
subsequent decision of the Greek government to close the banks and impose capital controls 
influenced referendum vote intentions. Our argument suggests that if this foreign intervention 
indeed served as a credible signal of the creditorsÕ resolve not to accommodate a negative 
Greek referendum vote, the bank shutdown should increase the propensity of Greek voters to 
vote for the bailout proposal in the referendum. To test this empirical implication of our 
argument, Figure 7 uses data from all 33 public opinion polls published during the 
referendum campaign in Greece to show how the proportion of respondents intending  
 
*** Figure 7 about here *** 
 
																																																								
36 To examine the effect of foreign threats, we also analyzed the results of a survey experiment conducted 
shortly before the referendum campaign that randomly assigned warnings by domestic and foreign policymakers 
about the consequences of a debt default. The results (included in the online appendix) show that respondents 
were more willing to repay the debt when exposed to a warning by a foreign policymaker, although this effect 
depends on whom the policymaker represents. This suggests that foreign threats can be effective.  
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to vote Yes in the referendum evolved throughout the campaign. 37 We classify each poll 
according to the date of fieldwork and distinguish between polls conducted prior and posterior 
to the bank shutdown, which was announced in the evening of June 28, becoming effective 
the next day, June 29.38 For each group of polls, we plot a local polynomial smoother that 
indicates the evolution of public opinion during each phase. As expected, the announcement 
of the bank closure and capital controls had a significant effect on vote intentions. In line with 
our argument that a costly foreign signal should increase support for a cooperative vote, the 
bank shutdown bumped up vote intentions in favour of the bailout package by approximately 
10 percentage points, thus bringing the predicted outcome to a much narrower margin. 
Although this did not ultimately change the outcome of the referendum, which was still 
rejected with only 39% Yes-votes, this is a fairly substantial increase in average vote 
intentions, which would have been able to sway the vote in a closer race. 
To corroborate this finding, we asked voters in our referendum survey if they had 
changed their vote intention as a result of the bank shutdown. About one fifth (21%) of all 
voters answered affirmatively. The majority of those who changed their vote intention 
because of the bank closure, switched to a Yes-vote (12.3% of all voters). Some voters (4.9% 
of all voters) became undecided, and a few voters (3.8% of all voters) hardened their position 
and switched towards a No-vote. This latter group illustrates that costly signals sent by 
foreign policymakers can also backfire, pushing voters towards a non-cooperative vote. 
Nonetheless, the net effect is positive, and these individual-level results correspond closely 
with the average 10 percentage point increase in Yes-vote intentions that we saw in the 
analysis of all polls shown in Figure 7. 
																																																								
37 We plot the percentage of Yes-voters over all voters that declared an intention to vote Yes or No. For a list of 
polls used, see the online appendix. 
38 For those cases where the date of fieldwork was not available, we take the date the poll was published. When 
a poll was conducted over two days, we consider the fieldwork was conducted between both days. No poll was 
conducted both before and after the announcement of the bank shutdown. 
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Our argument suggests that foreign signals influence the vote because they affect 
expectations about the likely foreign reaction to a non-cooperative referendum outcome. In 
the last step of our analysis, we examine this prediction empirically, testing whether the bank 
holiday predicts expectations about the consequences of a No-vote in the referendum. For this 
analysis, our dependent variable, expectations, is trichotomous (respondent expects Grexit, 
new negotiations, or does not know/answer). We therefore employ a multinomial logit 
regression model, where those that Òdid not know/answerÓ serve as reference category. This 
allows us to investigate whether shifts to and from this category can be attributed to the bank 
closure after controlling for all the covariates included in the previous analyses.39 
 
*** Figure 8 about here *** 
 
Figure 8 shows the determinants of respondentsÕ expectations about the consequences 
of a No-vote. In line with our findings on the determinants of the vote intention, our results 
show that both partisan attachments and euro preferences influence these expectations. 
Sociodemographic variables, such as education and occupation, also seem to matter. The most 
relevant result, however, is that after controlling for all these influences on votersÕ  
expectations, the bank closure also affects peopleÕs expectations. Those who changed their 
vote intention because of the bank shutdown were significantly less optimistic about the likely 
foreign response to a No-vote: Substantively, the bank shutdown reduces the predicted 
probability of expecting new negotiations by almost 20 percentage points.40 At the same time, 
the bank shutdown is associated with an increase in expectations that a No-vote would push 
the country towards Grexit by almost 10 percentage points. The strategy of European 
																																																								
39 The full multinomial analyses is displayed in the online appendix (table A.3). To mirror the previous analyses, 
we also conducted matching analyses. We again obtain substantively identical estimates of the effect of the bank 
closure on expectations (figures A.4 and A.5 in online appendix). Both approaches produce near-to-perfect 
balance and similar ATT estimates. 
40 For both the analysis on vote intention and expectations, we also explored interactive effects between the 
bank shutdown and partisan variables, but did not find any evidence for an effect. 
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policymakers not to accommodate GreeceÕs new financing needs during the referendum 
campaign thus succeeded in making some voters more pessimistic about the likely 
consequences of a No-outcome in the referendum41.  
Overall, these results demonstrate that the European policymakersÕ decision to take a 
hard line on Greece did indeed convince some voters that they would not accommodate a 
negative referendum outcome, increasing Greek votersÕ propensity to support the bailout 
proposal. Yet our results also demonstrate the difficulties associated with this strategy. 
Despite the huge cost that the ECBÕs decision generated, both for Greece and the other 
European states, this foreign intervention did not sway enough voters to change the 
referendum outcome. Our analysis thus suggests that while international actors can indeed 
affect expectations in referendum campaigns through costly signals, this influence has its 
limits.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In recent years, popular referendums about questions of international cooperation and 
supranational integration have posed an increasing challenge to European integration. What 
unites these referendums is that a direct democratic vote that rejects further cooperation or 
reverses existing levels of cooperation affects not just the referendum country, but is costly 
for other countries as well. At the same time, the response of the other countries to such a 
negative referendum outcome shapes how the vote will ultimately play out for the referendum 
country. In this strategic setting, foreign policymakers have incentives to warn domestic 
voters about a harsh foreign reaction to a non-cooperative referendum vote in order to induce 
them to vote cooperatively.  
																																																								
41 In the online appendix, we present causal mediation analyses to account for the effect of the bank shutdown 
on the vote through expectations. 
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Our paper has explored one aspect of this strategic setting, focusing on how votersÕ 
expectations about foreign reactions to a non-cooperative referendum outcome shape vote 
intentions, and whether foreign policymakers can influence these expectations. Leveraging 
survey data from the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, a referendum in which the stakes of 
other countries were particularly high, we showed that expectations about the likely 
consequences of a No-vote had an unusually large impact on vote choice. Voters more 
optimistic about the foreign response were much more likely to vote non-cooperatively, than 
voters expecting a harsh foreign reaction were much more likely to cast a Yes-vote. Our 
analysis also suggested that foreign policymakers were able to influence these expectations 
among some voters by sending a costly signal (cutting Greece off from additional financing) 
about their determination not to accommodate a non-cooperative referendum outcome. Our 
paper thus contributes to unpacking the popular dynamics and strategic interactions in the 
2015 Greek bailout referendum, a fascinating and important instance of a foreign policy 
referendum with large potential consequences for other nations 
Our results point to a number of open questions that future research should investigate: 
how are signals and statements by foreign policymakers received in different contexts? How 
costly do such signals have to be in order to sway voters in favor of supporting new or 
continued cooperation? And, moving up one level of analysis, (how) do policymakers 
anticipate and respond to the expected reactions of other countries and the feedback effects 
between their actions and expectations? 
More generally, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the mass politics of 
international cooperation. While the role of the mass public in creating new international 
agreements has been studied in detail, the spillover effects of popular rejections of new or 
existing forms of cooperation and integration on other countries, and the role of foreign 
interventions in domestic elections and referendum campaigns have so far received much less 
attention. Yet, as these spillover effects are growing, especially in highly integrated countries 
	 26 
such as the member states of the European Union, the stakes other countries have in the 
outcome of domestic referendums and elections is equally growing. This is most vividly 
demonstrated by the vast consequences of the pro-Brexit vote in the 2016 UK referendum for 
the remaining 27 EU member states, but is also evidenced by the strong interest abroad in the 
2017 French elections. In this setting, the interaction of policymakers not only with their own 
publics, but also with voters abroad is becoming increasingly salient, raising important 
questions with regard to international cooperation, democracy, and national sovereignty, 
which open new and exciting avenues for future research.  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Voting outcomes in foreign policy referendums, 1970-2016 
 
Source: C2D Datenbank, Zentrum fr Demokratie Aarau 
Notes: Classification of referendum outcome based on whether referendum result resulted in more/continued international cooperation or not. 
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Figure 2: Expectations about the consequences of non-cooperative referendum outcomes  
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Figure 3: Vote intentions and Expectations Ð Descriptive Statistics  
	
 
Note: Based on UoM survey from 4 July 2015. Data are weighted with respect to gender and age.  
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Figure 4: Determinants of the NO-Vote in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum.  
	  
Note: Dots indicate estimates of change in the estimated probability of voting No as we move from the reference 
category to each category denoted on the vertical axis. Reference categories are: DK/DA (expectations and euro 
questions); 18-24 age group; pensioner; primary education; male; urban, and Nea Demokratia (party preference). 
Logit regression analysis, 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 5: Average Treatment Effect of expecting Grexit on the likelihood of voting No in 
the Greek Referendum  
	
 
Note: Black dots denote the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, with Abadie Imbens standard errors 
accompanying them. Using these standard errors, the horizontal closed segments indicate the 95% confidence 
intervals in the case of genetic matching and linearized confidence intervals in the entropy balancing case. 
 
	 	
●
●
Entropy
Balancing
Genetic
Matching
−0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
Data pre−processing Results
	 35 
 
Figure 6: The Impact of Expectations on the referendum vote varies according to euro 
preferences. 
 
  
Note: Bars denote the marginal effect of expectations, given euro preferences, the vertical bars capture the 95% 
confidence intervals. Regression model contains all covariates shown in figure 4. 
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Figure 7: Effect of bank shutdown on average support for bailout proposal (yes-vote) 
based on 33 polls on referendum vote intention. 
	
 
Note: Each dot/triangle represents a poll published during the referendum campaign. The blue curve denotes 
local average estimates, shaded areas denote 95% confidence bands. Sources for each poll in online appendix. 
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Figure 8: Determinants of Expectations about the Consequences of a No-vote. 
 
Expectation: Grexit Expectation: New Negotiations 
 
Note: Dots indicate estimates of change in the estimated probability of expecting Grexit (left panel) or new 
negotiations (right panel), compared to the ÒdonÕt know/no answerÓ category based on multinomial logit 
regression analysis, with 95% confidence intervals. Reference categories of the predictors are the same as in 
Figure 5.  
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